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Abstract
We motivate, deﬁne and design a simple static analysis to check that comparisons of ﬂoating point values
use compatible bit widths and thus compatible precision ranges. Precision mismatches arise due to the
diﬀerence in bit widths of processor internal ﬂoating point registers (typically 80 or 64 bits) and their
corresponding widths when stored in memory (64 or 32 bits). The analysis guarantees that ﬂoating point
values from memory (i.e. array elements, instance and static ﬁelds) are not compared against ﬂoating point
numbers in registers (i.e. arguments or locals).
Without such an analysis, static symbolic veriﬁcation is unsound and hence may report false negatives.
The static analysis is fully implemented in Clousot, our static contract checker based on abstract interpre-
tation.
Keywords: Abstract Interpretation, Design by Contracts, Floating points, Numerical Abstract Domains,
Static Analysis, .NET.
1 Introduction
Comparing ﬂoating point values in programs can introduce subtle errors due to
precision mismatches of the compared values. Precision mismatches arise as a result
of truncating typically larger register internal ﬂoating point widths (80 or 64 bits)
to the ﬂoating point width used when storing the value into main memory (64 or
32 bits). Such mismatches may produce unexpected program behavior, resulting in
programmer confusion and—if ignored—unsound static program analysis.
We introduce the problem with the code snippet in Fig. 1, extracted from the
“classical” bank account example annotated with contracts [8]. In this paper, we
use C# as our language and the .NET runtime. However, the general problem ad-
dressed in this paper is present in numerous programming languages and runtimes.
We address these other contexts in Sect. 5.
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public class Account
{
private float balance;
public Account(float initial)
{
Contract.Requires(initial >= 0.0f);
balance = initial;
}
public void Deposit(float amount)
{
Contract.Requires(amount >= 0.0);
Contract.Ensures(balance == Contract.OldValue(balance) + amount);
balance = balance + amount;
}
// Other methods here
}
Fig. 1. A C# code snippet for the classical Bank account example. Contract.Requires speciﬁes the precon-
dition, Contract.Ensures specify the postcondition, Contract.OldValue denotes the value of the argument
expression at the entry point (not directly expressible in C#). It turns out that, as it is, the postcondition
is incorrect, and it may fail at runtime for opportune values of amount.
The class Account represents a bank account. The method Deposit updates
the balance by a given non-negative amount. The postcondition for Deposit states
that on method exit the balance has been correctly updated. The current balance
is stored in an instance ﬁeld of type float. The ECMA standard requires .NET
implementations of ﬂoating point types to follow the IEC:60559:1989 standard.
At a ﬁrst glance, one expects the postcondition to hold and any static an-
alyzer to easily prove it. In fact, a simple reasoning by symbolic propagation
(balance0 denotes the value of the ﬁeld balance at method entry) could be:
assert balance == balance0 + amount
⇐⇒ { by the assignment: balance = balance0 + amount }
assert balance0 + amount == balance0 + amount
⇐⇒ { by equality }
true
Unfortunately, a static analyzer for .NET performing this reasoning would be un-
sound! For instance, the following two lines of C# code:
var account = new Account(6.28318548f);
account.Deposit(3.14159274f);
cause a postcondition violation in the method Deposit (cf. Fig. 2).
What is wrong here? Let’s ﬁrst rule out causes that are not the problem:
• Overﬂow can be excluded, as ﬂoating point numbers cannot overﬂow (at worst,
operations result in special values ±∞ or NaN).
• Non-determinism is ruled out by the IEEE754 standard, and by the fact that the
code in the example is single-threaded.
• Cancellation is to be ruled out too: e.g. the numerical quantities are positive and
of the same order of magnitude.
• Floating point addition is commutative, so this is not the cause of the problem
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Fig. 2. A failure at runtime of the postcondition for Deposit.
either.
• Addition is not necessarly associative, but we do not need associativity here (we
are adding only two numbers).
The real culprit here is the equality test. In general all comparisons of ﬂoating point
values are problematic. However it is still unclear at ﬁrst sight why the comparison
is a source of problems here: after all we are adding up the same two quantities and
then comparing them for equality. If some rounding error occurs, then the same
error should occur in both additions, or won’t it?
The reason for the unexpected behavior is to be found deeper in the speciﬁcation
of the Common Language Runtime (Partition I, Sect. 12.1.3 of [1]):
Storage locations for ﬂoating-point numbers (statics, array elements, and ﬁelds of classes) are of ﬁxed
size. The supported storage sizes are float32 and float64 . Everywhere else (on the evaluation stack,
as arguments, as return types, and as local variables) ﬂoating-point numbers are represented using
an internal ﬂoating-point type. In each such instance, the nominal type of the variable or expression
is either float32 or float64 , but its value can be represented internally with additional range and/or
precision. The size of the internal ﬂoating-point representation is implementation-dependent, can vary,
and shall have precision at least as great as that of the variable or expression being represented. An
implicit widening conversion to the internal representation from float32 or float64 is performed when
those types are loaded from storage. [...] When a ﬂoating-point value whose internal representation
has greater range and/or precision than its nominal type is put in a storage location, it is
automatically coerced to the type of the storage location.
The standard allows exploiting the maximum precision available from the ﬂoating
point hardware for operations on values in registers despite of their nominal type,
provided that on memory stores the internal value is truncated to the nominal size.
It is now easy to see why we get the postcondition violation at runtime.
The result of the evaluation of the expression this.balance+ amount is in-
ternally stored at the maximum precision available from the hardware (on Intel
processors 80 bits registers, on ARM architectures 64 bits). In the example, the
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l = k (load const)
l = l1 (copy) l = (type) l1 (cast)
l = l1 op l2 (binary op)
l = o.f (load ﬁeld) o.f = l (store ﬁeld)
l = a[li] (load array) a[li] = l (store array)
Fig. 3. The simpliﬁed bytecode language we consider for the analysis. A constant k can only be a constant
belonging to the float32 or float64 ranges. Casting is allowed only to type ∈ {float32 , float64 }.
result of the addition is 9.42477822, a value that cannot be precisely represented
in 32 bits.
The successive ﬁeld store forces the value to be truncated to 32 bits, thereby
changing the value. In the example, 9.42477822 is coerced to a float, causing a loss
of precision resulting in the value 9.424778 being stored in the ﬁeld this.balance.
When the postcondition is evaluated, the truncated value of balance is re-
loaded from memory, but the addition in the postcondition is re-computed with
the internal precision. Comparing these two values causes the postcondition to fail,
since 9.424778 = 9.42477822.
Contribution
We present a simple static analysis to check that ﬂoating point comparisons (equal-
ities, inequalities) use operands of compatible types. When they are not compatible,
the analysis reports a warning message to the user, so that all successive valida-
tions should be understood as conditional. We fully implemented the analysis in
Clousot, our static contract checker based on abstract interpretation for .NET [2].
We validated the analysis by running it on the base class library of .NET where it
emitted 5 real warnings.
2 The Language
We illustrate our analysis on a minimalistic bytecode language. We make some
simplyﬁng assumptions. There are two kinds of variables: store variables (f, a ∈ S)
and locals (l, p ∈ L). Store variables are instance ﬁelds, static ﬁelds and arrays.
Local variables are locals, parameters, and the return value. Variables belong to
the set Vars = S ∪ L. Aliasing is not allowed.
The language has only two nominal ﬂoating point types (float32 , float64 ∈
TN ) and one internal ﬂoating point type (floatX ) such that 64 ≤ X. On x86,
floatX is float80, allowing extended ﬂoating point precision. Please note that the
.NET standard does not include a long double as for instance C [3], so application
programmers have no access to floatX types.
All variables have a nominal ﬂoating point type. At runtime, the nominal ﬂoat-
ing point type for locals may be widened but not that of store variables. We say
“may be widened”, as it depends on register allocation choices by the compiler. We
think it is reasonable to force the code to compute values independent of ﬂoating
point register allocation choices.
The simpliﬁed bytecode language is presented in Fig. 3. Floating point constants
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0 : l1 = this.balance
1 : l2 = amount + l1
2 : this.balance = l2
3 : l1 = this.balance
4 : lcomp = l1 == l2
Fig. 4. The (partial) compilation of the running example in our simple bytecode instruction set.
are loaded into locals (load const). Admissible constant values are only those ad-
mitted by the nominal types, i.e. ﬂoating point constants in 32 or 64 bits including
special values as ±∞ and NaN (Not-a-number).
Values can be copied to locals, retaining their internal value (copy). Casting is
allowed only to nominal types, with values narrowed or widened as needed (cast).
In general it is not true that if l1 and l have the same nominal type then (cast) is
semantically equivalent to (copy) as their internal type may diﬀer.
Binary operations are the usual ﬂoating point arithmetic ones (+,−, ∗, /) and
(unordered) comparison operations (==, <,≤,) (binary op). The result of a com-
parison is 0.0 if the comparison is false, 1.0 otherwise.
Values are loaded from and stored to ﬁelds ([load/store] ﬁeld). We do not dis-
tinguish between static and instance ﬁelds. Fields only contain values of nominal
types: therefore, when storing a local into a ﬁeld, its value is automatically nar-
rowed to the ﬁeld nominal type value. If the value of l is too large or too small,
then it is approximated to ±∞ or to 0. Similarly, values read from arrays have a
nominal type value and values written into arrays are narrowed to the nominal type
of the array type. Arrays are indexed by local values, and in addition to the usual
out-of-bounds checking, we assume that the computation stops also when li is a
ﬂoating point number with non-zero decimal part or it is NaN.
Example 2.1 The compilation to simpliﬁed bytecode of the body of method
deposit (without contracts) of Fig. 1 is in Fig. 4. Please note that the store and
load ﬁeld operations are now made explicit in the bytecode.
3 The Abstract Semantics
3.1 Abstract Domain
The abstract domain T we use captures the potential runtime ﬂoating point width
a variable may have, which may be more precise than its nominal type. Therefore,
the elements of T belong to the set Vars −→ TX where 64 ≤ X and TX is the abstract
domain:
	
float32

float64

floatX

⊥
  
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l = k(τ) = τ [l → η(l)]
l = l1(τ) = τ [l → τ(l1)]
l = (type)l1(τ) = τ [l → type]
l = l1opl2(τ) = τ [l → floatX ]
l = o.f(τ) = τ [l → η(o.f)]
o.f = l(τ) = τ
l = a[li](τ) = τ [l → η(a[·])
a[li] = l(τ) = τ
Fig. 5. The abstract semantics. The function η returns the nominal type of a variable.
If X = 64, i.e. the hardware does not provide any wider ﬂoating point register,
then float64 and floatX co-incide. This is the case on ARM architectures, but
not for x86 architectures which provide extra precision registers.
The operations of the abstract domain T (order, join, meet) are the functional
pointwise extensions of those on the lattice above. No widening is required as the
lattice is of ﬁnite height.
3.2 Abstract Semantics
The abstract semantics · ∈ P × T −→ T statically determines, at each program
point an internal type for each local variable. Store variables are known, by the
ECMA standard, to have their nominal type coincide with the internal type.
The abstract transfer function is deﬁned in Fig. 5. The only constant values that
can be explicitly represented are those admissible as float32 or float64 values:
the internal type of a local after a load constant is its nominal type. Variable copy
retains the internal type. The ECMA standard guarantees that casting a value v to
type truncates the value v to one in the type range. If v is too large or too small
for type then it is rounded to ±∞ or 0. The result of a binary operation is a value
of maximum hardware precision, which we denote by floatX . Reading from a ﬁeld
or an array location provides a value of the nominal type (no extra precision can be
stored in ﬁelds). Writing into a ﬁeld or an array location causes the truncation of
the value to the corresponding nominal type.
Example 3.1 For the bytecode in Fig. 4, with τ0 = [amount → floatX ], the
inferred internal types after each program point are:
0 : τ1 = τ0[l1 → float32 ]
1 : τ2 = τ1[l2 → floatX ]
2 : τ3 = τ2
3 : τ4 = τ3[l1 → float32 ]
4 : τ5 = τ4[lcomp → floatX ]
3.3 Checking
Checking a program P for precision mismatch in ﬂoating point comparisons is now
quite easy. First run the analysis P to collect an over-approximation of the internal
types for each program point. Then, for each (binary op) in P
pp : l = l1 op l2
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Fig. 6. The warning emitted by Clousot.
such that op is one of ==,≤, < get τpp, which is the abstract pre-state for pp.
If τpp(l1) or τpp(l2) are diﬀerent from 	, and τpp(l1) = τpp(l2) then the com-
parison is on variables with the same internal type. Otherwise, the comparison may
happen on ﬂoating point values of diﬀerent width, and hence a warning to the user
should be emitted.
Example 3.2 In our running example, τ5(l2) = floatX and τ5(l1) = float32 .
So a warning is emitted to the user (cf. Fig 6).
3.4 Fixing the warnings
When the analysis cannot prove that the operands of a comparison are of the same
type, the user can ﬁx it by adding explicit casts. For instance in our running
example, the right postcondition is one where the type coercion is made explicit:
Contract.Ensures(balance == (float)Contract.OldValue(balance) + amount);
From a programmer’s point of view, this coercion seems redundant, as the expres-
sion Contract.OldValue(balance) + amount already has nominal type float32 .
He/she may expect that the explicit cast to float32 would be a no-operation. But
for the reasons explained in this paper, the cast may be a truncation.
4 Implementation and Experiment
We have implemeted the analysis described in this paper in Clousot, our static
analyzer for CodeContracts [2]. The analyzer ﬁrst reads the IL from disk, then con-
structs for each method the control ﬂow graph, inserting contracts at the necessary
points. Then it simpliﬁes the program by getting rid of the evaluation stack and
the heap, reconstructs expressions lost during compilation, and ﬁnally produces a
scalar program.
Several analyses are run on the top of the scalar program, i.e. non-null, numeri-
cal, array, or arithmetic. We added the detection of precision mismatches in ﬂoating
point comparisons described in this paper to the arithmetic analysis. The analy-
sis is fast and accurate: on the core library of the .NET framework, mscorlib.dll,
constisting of 25089 methods, it adds less than 10 seconds to the total time, and
it reports 5 warnings. We manually inspected those, and they all represent real
warnings similar to the following example:
bool IsNonZero(float f) {
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return f != 0.0F;
}
According to the ECMA standard, the parameter f of callers may be passed in
registers and thus use more bits than float32 in memory. Therefore, the inequality
comparison against 0.0F may result in true, even though f truncated to float32
is equal to 0.0F. As an example of where this could result in problems, consider:
class C {
float a; // should never be 0.0F
void Update(float f) {
if (IsNonZero(f)) {
this.a = f;
}
...
In the above code, the programmer expects to guard the assignment to the ﬁeld
to make sure the value stored in the ﬁeld is never 0.0F. However, due to register
allocation of f, a value represented using more than 32 bits, close to 0.0F but not
equal to 0.0F can pass the test and be truncated to 0.0F when stored into this.a.
5 Discussion
Some languages and compilers have addressed the problem described in this paper
using other means. C compilers typically oﬀer compile-time switches to control
whether the compiler should emit code that adheres strictly to the bit-widths de-
clared in types, or whether it is allowed to use extra precision for computations in
registers.
Using strict adherence to the declared types requires compilers to emit trun-
cating casts after each ﬂoating point operation that could result in more precision,
or putting the ﬂoating point unit into a mode that automatically performs trunca-
tion [10]. The Java standard provides the strictfp keyword to enforce this trun-
cating behavior and thereby avoids the problem described in this paper entirely at
the cost of precision and speed.
We decided to detect problems with precision mismatches only when comparing
ﬂoating point numbers. Another view would be to write an analysis that warns
users whenever some higher precision ﬂoat is implicitly cast to the nominal type
width (eﬀectively whenever a result is stored into memory). The problem with such
an alternative analysis is that it would a) warn about most memory writes, b) miss
implicit narrowings arising due to register spilling into memory introduced by the
compiler. We found that warning about comparisons addresses the problem in a
more actionable way.
6 Related Work
Previous work in this area focuses on enhancing static analysis techniques to soundly
analyze programs with ﬂoating points. For instance [4,6,5] present static analyses to
spot the source of imprecision in ﬂoating point computations. [9] introduces ideas to
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extend numerical abstract domains to the analysis of IEEE 754-compliant ﬂoating
point values and [7] introduces program transformation techniques to reduce the
error in ﬂoating point computations.
Our work is orthogonal to those in that we are not interested in the actual
values of the computation but only in detecting situations that may cause unex-
pected comparison results. The need for such detection is particularly important to
avoid runtime failures of contracts that seemingly have been validated via symbolic
execution.
7 Conclusions
We described a simple static analysis to detect the absence of “surprising” behaviors
of comparisons involving ﬂoating point numbers. The analysis is motivated by
feeedback from users of our Code Contract tools. They reported false negatives
similar to the example described in the introduction. We integrated the analysis in
the static checker tool for Code Contracts, and experience shows it to be accurate
enough.
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